

**Page Denied**

~~TOP SECRET~~

## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



TS-552/VP

29 APR 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SNIE on Soviet Support for Terrorism (U)

1. (S) Regretfully, I am unable to endorse the NIC redraft of the SNIE. I appreciate the difficulty of developing such a draft and the hard work which went into the redraft. I can concur with your view of the shortfalls of the DIA submission, but I believe that the NIC draft has failed to correct the problems -- noted in your critique -- that plagued the SNIE at the outset.

2. (TS) To be specific, I find the Summary Conclusions section wholly inadequate; it should be eliminated. The Key Judgments section is significantly better than what has been written before. I could concur with it if key changes were made. My problems with the section include the following:

- The distinction made between "revolutionary violence" and "terrorism", so far as I can judge, follows Soviet practice. Use of "revolutionary violence" implies a legitimacy which lacks substance and is apologetic. One man's "revolutionary violence" is another's "terrorism." (Page v & others).

- In the context of deliberate Soviet encouragement, direction, and support for terrorist activities the distinction between "national insurgencies," "separatist-irredentist movements," and "nihilist groups" is simply misleading. The distinction, I believe, issues from local circumstances, which, from the Soviet viewpoint, require different tactics and avenues of support. The terrorist acts of such groups are the same whatever we or the Soviets call the groups. Moreover, the distinctions between the groups should not be used to imply that the Soviets see their contribution to Soviet global objectives as being different in substance, or more or less worthy of support. Decisions about support are based on objective factors -- impact, effectiveness, chances of success, operative circumstances. (Pages v & vi).

- The terms "direct" and "indirect", used to characterize Soviet support, tend to exculpate the Soviets rather than describe their method. I realize that this result is certainly not intended by the drafters. However, by its very nature, support for this kind of warfare is clandestine: in other words -- indirect. In the final analysis, the threat to US interests is affected by the substance of the assistance, not whether it comes directly from the Soviet Union or through several cutouts. (Pages v, vi, & vii).

TS-810216

Copy 2Classified By DIA-VPDeclassify on 29 Apr 1986  
Review on~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

- The judgment about Soviet policy toward "nihilist groups" is inadequate from my reading of the evidence. That evidence -- the curiel apparat, the training offered by Soviet client states, the transit and safehaven privileges, etc. -- is sufficient to support a strong belief that the Soviets are supporting the so-called western "nihilists" despite public disavowals of the methods the groups employ. To use the SNIE term, the support is indirect -- but one would expect it to be indirect. I think it is reasonable to presume that the Soviets see the circumstances in Europe as similar to those in South Africa. There, we know that the Soviets have told the Africa National Congress (ANC) that the only paramilitary revolutionary technique available is urban terrorism. (Page vi).

- Use of the words "support" and "condone" to characterize the Soviet involvement with its communist satellites and client states or entities in terrorist activities implies that they are independent actors. I believe that this is a fundamental misinterpretation of the relationship. The evidence on Soviet involvement with Eastern Europe and Cuba indicates full coordination and, in effect, Soviet control. Given the extent of PLO and Yemeni dependence on the Soviet Union and its satellites and the evidence of Soviet training, "requests" for assistance in the Western Hemisphere, "advice" on how to conduct terrorist activities, etc., I must conclude that the Soviets exercise overpowering influence over the actions of those entities as well. In the case of Libya, Soviet and Libyan objectives frequently coincide and I doubt that the Soviets encounter much difficulty convincing Qadhafi to support what the Soviets want supported. (Page vi).

- Too much is made of Soviet public and private statements about the evils of terrorism. Soviet practice is, as stated above, to distinguish between legitimate revolutionary violence - which they support, and "criminal" terrorism, which they condemn verbally. This practice should be explained in the SNIE, but not used as a basis for our own examination of terrorism. (Page vii).

- The key role played by the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the inevitable direction of the ruling members of the Politburo in Soviet support for terrorist activities (which, again, they describe as legitimate revolutionary violence) are omitted in the Key Judgments and, indeed, the body of the SNIE. This is a major failing. (Pages vii & viii).

- As noted in the main text, the Soviets have coordinated the support of "revolutionary" groups for Latin American terrorists and the organization of those terrorists as well. Thus, the contrary general statement in the Key Judgments is erroneous. Moreover, Soviet involvement in the world socialist

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(communist) movement and other fora in which these groups participate, the known and suspected activities of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and Soviet "requests" for PEO support for Armenian terrorists are external signs of a significant Soviet coordinating function, world-wide. Indeed, the geographic placement of Soviet proxies around the globe suggests a regionalization of Soviet coordination, which takes advantage of ethnic relationships which could not be developed with Soviet nationals in direct associations. (Page viii).

3. (TS) These comments on the Key Judgments are relevant to the main text of the SNIE as well. My difficulties with the main text are, however, much greater in both scope and substance. I have been able to devote too little time to the text to develop a detailed critique. I can, however, relate a few nagging concerns:

- Despite the initial words in the Key Judgments section, the main text of the SNIE leaves me with the impression that the Soviet Union is a benign actor, providing much of the wherewithal of terrorism but exercising little control over its use or distribution or over the recipients of the Soviet largesse. My instincts, my reading of available evidence, and my experience say that this treatment contradicts reality. If the Bulgarians send arms to Turkish terrorists, there is no doubt in my mind that the mastermind of the act resides in Moscow not Sofia. If Yemeni terrorist training camps, staffed and funded by the Soviets, are used to train "nihilist" terrorists, I cannot believe that the Soviets do not endorse the activity or that the "nihilist" leadership has any doubt about whose support they enjoy. These are but two examples of many in the main text where logical analysis would easily have filled the gaps in direct evidence.


- I am very much disturbed by the references to Vladimir Sakharov and Jan Sejna. Sakharov has testified that while he was an employee of the MFA his work was in large part for the KGB. The paragraph on page II-3 about Jan Sejna states that Sejna knew nothing about "terrorist" training and in the same paragraph notes his knowledge of Czech assistance to "national liberation movements". Here, again, the draft appears to have inadvertently accepted Soviet usage. The Soviets, of course, do not support terrorists; they support legitimate "revolutionaries" -- by definition. Sejna has recently stated to me that, at the time of his debriefings, he was using the Soviet lexicon (since he knew no other) which does not include the word "terrorist" when discussing "legitimate revolutionaries". I am convinced that he does know about Czech support through 1968 for those revolutionaries whom I would call terrorists and about the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the intelligence services of Eastern Europe. I believe that, because of our own particular perspectives, we have failed to exploit these two sources and others like them in the subject area of this SNIE.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

- Finally, the main text appears to me to ignore years of Soviet operational tradecraft experience relative to Soviet subversive operations -- use of cutouts, third parties, and surrogates to provide plausible denial, overlaid with propaganda and disinformation to further obscure Soviet involvement. In any case, it would be useful to include a major section on such operational techniques to help explain the nature of the evidence.

4. (S) I want to thank you for this opportunity to preview the redraft of the SNIE. I regret that I could not be more positive in my comments. I do appreciate the effort which must have gone into this draft, but I believe that we are not yet out of the woods. While the attempt some of my people made in the earlier redraft was less than adequate, I would like to offer to take another try. I think all of us are beginning to understand better the problems faced in hurriedly putting a paper like this together.



EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Page Denied**

~~TOP SECRET~~  
The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

30 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: SNIE on Soviet Support for Terrorism

1. Thanks for your critique on Draft No. 3 of the SNIE on terrorism. I have already asked for revisions dealing with some of the points it makes. I would rather not take the time to wait for the full redraft but would be glad to get any redrafting suggestions as soon as you can make them available. I think we would both like to get this out as soon as possible. My notion is to now let one go around to identify points and dissent at working level and as soon as possible bring it before the NFIB.

2. The issue that I ask be dealt with is the one set forth in the last full paragraph 2 of your critique. I think the existence and significance of the Soviet apparatus needs to be brought way up front and I have asked that this be done. I agree with you that the word "condone" is not appropriate in reference to an issue which consistently trains terrorism and distributes weapons around the world. I don't feel quite the same way about the word "support".

3. I agree that the document should be carefully looked at to minimize the degree with which we use language which the Soviets have developed to put on a noble face to obscure activities they carry out to further aggressive designs. I think this could be done at the working group level and NFIB process. In the meantime, please go ahead in preparing any draft language which you think would improve the final document.

*Bill*

William J. Casey

TS-810216/1

Copy 3

Rvw 30 Apr 1987

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Page Denied**



TOP SECRET

30 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: SNIE on Soviet Support for Terrorism

This response to General Tighe reflects my reaction to  
his critique.

25X1

25X1

*for* William J. Casey //

Attachment:  
Memorandum dated 30 April 1981

Unclassified When Separated  
From Top Secret Attachment

TS-810216/2  
Copy 2

Rvw 30 Apr 1987  
Drv From TS-810216

25X1

TOP SECRET